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Charles T. DuMars*
Evaluating Congressional Limits on a
State's Severance Tax Equity Interest
in Its Natural Resources: An Essential
Responsibility for the Supreme Court
The capacity of states to levy taxes on extractive industries' operating
within their borders has never been questioned.2 But when the level of
these taxes gives the appearance of an attempt to capture "economic
rent" 3 at the apparent expense of the resource poor states, with declining
industrial tax bases, the debate becomes intense. In support of Montana's
30% severance tax on coal, Senator Marcus recently remarked:
Montanans have long experience with natural resource develop-
ment. We know that the costs of development do not end when the
resources are gone. Fabulous gold deposits and then fabulous copper
reserves were exploited-and then sent out of state. Today these
resources are largely gone. But the environment and social damage
remain-and is still being paid for by Montanans. Montanans also
watched the coal boom in Appalachia. We saw what happened when
the boom turned to bust-the abject poverty. Mr. President, Mon-
tanans believe that we should not come to the federal government
for help in dealing with the problems of energy development. So,
*Professor of Law, the University of New Mexico.
1. This article concerns itself with taxes levied on the mining of leaseable minerals, such as
coal and on the mining of hard rock minerals, such as copper. There are numerous other types of
taxes levied on both the severance and processing of natural resources with a state, to which this
discussion is also relevant. See. e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-25-4 (Mitchie 1978) (resource excise
tax); N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-25-5 (Mitchie 1978) (processing tax); N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-26-1
(Mitchie 1978) (severance tax).
2. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). Any such tax would,
of course, be subject to invalidation if it was found to be so arbitrary as to constitute an unlawful
confiscation of property. See A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934). Absent this
restraint, this power has been assumed to be at the heart of state sovereignty.
3. The concept of "economic rent" is variously described in the literature. In general layman's
terms, this means the capacity of a market participant to capture a uniquely high profit from the
sale of his commodity because its unique nature causes a high demand. This high demand, coupled
with the inability of buyers to shift to other fuel sources, yields economic rent to the seller greater
than the normal profits that can be expected by market participants. For an excellent discussion of
the concept of economic rent, see Church, Conflicting Federal, State and Local Interest Trends in
State and Local Energy Taxation: Coal and Copper-A Case in Point, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 278
(1978).
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we have moved to fill that void by imposing reasonable and respon-
sible taxes on coal. 4
While Montanans legitimately seek not to duplicate the poverty level
in Appalachia, other non-resource producing states with declining econ-
omies legitimately seek to avoid that fate as well. Senator Durenburger
of Minnesota has argued equally vehemently in support of federal leg-
islative attempts to curb severance taxes:
This matter now takes on increased importance in light of President
Reagan's efforts to return more responsibility to the states-the phi-
losophy of devolution. As the transfer of income and tax base con-
tinues from energy rich to energy poor states, we must carefully
consider the increased burden devolution carries with it. Is it feasible
to return responsibility to states so widely different in their economic
base without a corresponding federal policy designed to compensate
for these disparities. Is it fair to expect the states and localities that
suffer from a declining economy to provide the same level of public
services as those states flush with energy generated revenues? Is it
desirable in a federal system to accept the vastly different levels of
public services that will inevitably result from an unabated flow of
energy dollars?5
Senator Durenberger raises a number of difficult income distribution ques-
tions at the heart of federalism. In this article I do not propose to answer
all of these questions or survey the law of resource taxation. This has
been thoroughly done elsewhere. 6 Rather, this article examines the Su-
preme Court's role in the inevitable litigation should Congress act to place
a ceiling on state severance taxes. It also discusses the impact of Com-
monwealth Edison v. Montana 7should such a case arise. Finally, it ex-
plores the policy implications of such a ceiling.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana8
is the crucial starting point in any discussion of state resource taxation.
There, Montana faced a challenge to its severance tax on coal. Although
it has imposed a severance tax since 1921 on the output of coal mining
4. Senator Marcus is quoted in L. Parker, Energy: Limiting State Coal Severance Taxes, Issue
Brief at No. IB 80060 (Wash. D.C. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, No.
1980).
5. Opening statement by Senator Dake Durenberger, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, Fiscal Disparities Hearing on the Commerce Clause and Severance Taxes (July 15, 1981)
quoted and discussed in Kneese, Typical Cases Involving Natural Resources, REGIONAL CON-
FLICT AND NATIONAL POLICY Ch. 4 (Price, Ed.) (in press, 1982).
6. One of the best surveys in this area can be found in Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations
on State Taxation, AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1 (1982). See also, Browde and
DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism's
Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REV. 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Browde].
7. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Commonwealth Edison].
8. Id.
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on both private land and federal land, in 1975 it markedly increased the
level of tax. The increased severance tax is levied at varying rates de-
pending on the value, energy content, and method of extraction, and may
equal a maximum of 30% of the "contract sales price." 9 Under a 1976
constitutional amendment, effective in 1979, at least 50% of the revenues
generated by this severance tax must be paid into a permanent trust fund,
the principal of which can be invaded only if supported by a vote of
three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature.
Four Montana coal producers and eleven out-of-state utilities who pur-
chased coal from these producers filed suit in state court in Montana
seeking injunctive relief and recovery of taxes paid under this provision.
They argued that the 30% tax violated both the Commerce Clause and
the Supremacy Clause. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. This decision was affirmed by the Montana
Supreme Court,' ° which held that the Commerce Clause was not impli-
cated because a tax on coal production was not "in commerce" or alter-
natively, that the 30% level of taxation did not burden commerce because
it was fairly related to services provided by Montana to the coal industry.
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the Supremacy Clause argument
because it found no federal statute in conflict with the tax. The appeal
to the United States Supreme Court raised three basic issues: 1) whether
the Montana Supreme Court reliance on the 1920s Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery" holding that mining activity is not "in commerce" was proper;
2) if mining was in commerce, whether the Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady12 "fairly related to services" test should be applied to severance
taxes, and 3) whether the state tax was preempted by federal law.
To very few people's surprise, 3 the 1920s mechanical test for appli-
cation of the Commerce Clause was rejected. Rather, the court found the
Commerce Clause applicable to the severance of coal destined for inter-
state commerce and went straight to the test adopted in Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady. Complete Auto Transit had adopted a four-part test for
determining the constitutionality of state taxes on goods in interstate
commerce. Under this test, to sustain a tax on commerce the state must
show: nexus with the taxing state; proper apportionment between states;
non-discriminatory application; and that the tax is fairly related to services
provided by the taxing state. Obviously, the severance of minerals within
9. The "contract sales price" is defined under Montana law as the price of coal extracted and
prepared for shipment F.O.B. mine, excluding the amount charged by the seller to pay taxes paid
on production. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2951, n. I.
10. Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847 (1980).
11. 260 U.S. 245 (1922). For a discussion of the history of this case, see Browde, note 6, supra,
at 18-22.
12. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
13. See Browde, supra note 6 for a discussion of the "resource isolation" cases.
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a state's borders provided sufficient nexus with the taxing state. Since
the coal could be severed only once, it was properly apportioned-no
similar taxable event could occur in any other state. The statute applied
to severance of all coal irrespective of state of destination, so it was found
to be nondiscriminatory. This was true even through 90% of the coal
affected was shipped out of state.
While the conclusion that the court would not imply a discriminatory
purpose because of disproportionate impact on sister states seems clear,
the court's reasoning on this point was far from clear. The court has held
since West v. Kansas Natural Gas 4 that "resource isolationism"' 5 by
states is virtually per se unconstitutional because it is destructive of the
interstate free market found protected by the dormant Commerce Clause.
A state can rationally discriminate between two intra-state consumers of
a product and be subject only to equal protection analysis' 6 but discrim-
ination against a consumer because he lives across the state line is subject
to the strictest scrutiny.'7 Simply put, the court looks at any statute to
determine whether the discrimination is based on the fact a state line
separates those who receive benefits from those who do not.
Justice Marshall, surprisingly, cited the "free market cases" as au-
thority for not looking into the discriminatory impact of the Montana
statutes.
As the Court stated in West v. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229,
255 (1911) "in matters of foreign and intrastate commerce there are
no state lines. See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm. supra
at 331-332. Consequently, to accept appellants' theory and invalidate
the Montana tax solely because most of Montana's coal is shipped
across the very state borders that ordinarily are to be considered
irrelevant would require an significant, and in our view, unwarranted
departure from the rationale of our prior discrimination cases.
All would certainly agree that in an ideal, free interstate market state
lines should be considered irrelevant by states in drafting legislation. But
the consumer who is being denied benefits, solely because he lives across
such a line, should be surprised to find his argument rejected because the
court views these state lines as irrelevant. Indeed, the existence of the
state line has traditionally been at the heart of the court's inquiry: If the
14. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
15. Browde, supra note 6, at 30.
16. The equal protection analysis in matters of economics is extraordinarily light handed and is
in substance whether there was any rational basis for the classification. See Perry Modern Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979).
17. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
18. Commonwealth Edison, at 101 S. Ct. 2954.
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statute denies access to private resources such as coal solely because the
consumer lives across the state line, it violates the Commerce Clause.
The court ultimately turned to the fairly related to services test of
Complete Auto Transit and effectively eliminated it from future consid-
eration in constitutional adjudication, when an industry attacks a non-
discriminatory severance tax. This legal test was set to rest along with
its "substantive due process" antecedents of the '20s.' 9
While on its face "fairly related to services provided by the state"
suggests that one should measure the tax levied against the services
provided by the taxing state, the court flatly rejected this contention. It
held this phrase simply means that the "measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact." 20 Since the "measure"
of the Montana tax was "a percentage of the value of the coal taken,"
the court concluded that "the Montana tax is in 'proper proportion' to
appellant's activities within the state and, therefore to their consequent
enjoyment of the opportunity and protections which the state has af-
forded. "121
It hardly seems clear that a tax is always proportional to opportunities
afforded by the taxing state because it is levied in proportion to the rate
of extraction or the value of the resource. Under the court's view,a pro-
portional 90% of gross value tax on natural gas would be related to benefits
afforded by the taxing state even if the extraction caused no environmental
damage and the state provided no support services. Yet, a flat annual fee
for coal extraction equal to only 1 % of the gross value of the coal extracted
would not be related to services, even though the state provided extensive
police and fire protection and the mining activity caused extensive en-
vironmental disruption.
While the court abandoned the mechanical approach of Heisler, it has
now adopted the mechanical approach of Commonwealth Edison. This
was succinctly stated by Justice Blackmun in dissent:
No trial will ever be necessary on the issue of fair relationship so
long as a state is careful to impose a proportional rather than a flat
tax rate; thus, the court's role is no less "mechanical" than the
approach entertained in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S.
245 (1922) ...22
After "emasculating 21 3 the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit
19. The court has declined to evaluate statutes on "substantive due process" grounds since the
mid-1930s. Compare New State Ice Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also WRIGHT, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942).
20. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2958.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2968.
23. Id. This was Justice Blackman's view of the majority opinion.
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test by holding that any tax is fairly related to services provided by the
taxing state if it is levied in proportion to the rate of extraction, the Court
gave its reasons for doing so. It in effect held that evaluating the level
of a state severance tax under the dormant Commerce Clause was not an
appropriate judicial function. It reached this result based on two inde-
pendent but related rationales. One was that calculation of the degree of
monopolistic advantage created by a state's application of a facially neu-
tral severance tax would involve the application of economic principles
the court was not equipped to decipher:
The threshold questions whether a state enjoys a "monopoly"
position and whether the tax burden is shifted out of state, rather
than borne by in-state producers and consumers, would require com-
plex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for
the product and alternate sources of supply. . . . It has been suggested
that "the formidable evidentiary difficulties in appraising the geo-
graphical distribution of industry, with a view toward determining a
state's monopolistic position might make the Court's inquiry fu-
tile. 14
The second rationale was that this balancing of interests between states
was in its very nature political and for that reason the balance should be
struck by Congress:
But even apart from the difficulty of the judicial undertaking, the
nature of the fact finding and judgment that would be required of
the Courts merely reinforces the conclusion that questions about the
appropriate level of state taxes must be resolved through the political
process. Under our federal system the determination is to be made
by state legislatures in the first instance, and if necessary by Congress
when particular state taxes are thought to be contrary to federal
interests."
The court rejected the Supremacy Clause argument that the Montana
tax frustrated national energy policy reflected in federal legislation or
conflicted with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. 6 by finding no evidence
of conflict with any federal legislation.27
The state of Montana tax still stands, not because the majority con-
cluded it did not unduly burden commerce, but rather on the assumption
24. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2955 n. 8. The Court stated further:... "it is doubtful
whether any legal test could adequately reflect the numerous and competing economic, geographic,
demographic, social, and political considerations that must inform a decision about an acceptable
rate or level of state taxation, and yet be reasonably capable of application in a wide variety of
individual cases." Id. at 2959.3
25. Id. at 2959.
26. 41 Stat. 437. The court was persuaded particularly by Section 32 of the 1920 Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 189 which expressly authorizes severance taxes on minerals severed from the public domain.
27. Id. at 2962.
[Vol. 22
EVALUATING CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS
Congress was the appropriate forum for determining its constitutionality.
Justice White went even further in his concurring opinion: "There is
particular force in the argument that the tax is here and now unconsti-
tutional ... 28 (But the Court did not have to address that concern since,
when Congress considers it, Congress will strike it down because) "surely
Montana and other similarly situated states do not have the political power
to impose their will on the rest of the country."29
Justice White's observation is undoubtedly true-Montana and other
resource producing states cannot impose their will on the majority of
resource importing states and Congress could strike it down. But, who
stands to protect the minority of resource exporting states if the majority
of resource importing states impose their will on them? Here may lie the
danger in the Court's holding. If, as the Court seems to hold, the amount
of "state's equity" a state is entitled to capture from nonrenewable re-
sources through a severance tax is a nonjusticiable political question for
Congress-when Congress does act, Montana and other states may have
found their fate sealed by their "victory" in Commonwealth Edison. A
sudden upturn in the price of oil or deregulation of natural gas prices
may create a great demand for coal. If consuming states view the coal
price as too high, the Court's decision may leave Congress with a ready
handle on the coal spigot-lower the total price by repealing state sev-
erance taxes with federal legislation.
The significance of the court's holding regarding its role on such a
fundamental issue suggests the need for an analysis as to its constitutional
implications should the justiciability issue come up in the context of a
state challenge to a federal ceiling on state taxes.
The issue of the respective roles of the Court and Congress requires
examination because Commonwealth Edison does not stand alone in sug-
gesting deference to Congress where the dormant commerce clause touches
on state sovereignty. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap,3" the court refused
to balance Maryland's interest in its environment, reflected in its in-state
preferential purchasing policy against the interests of a free interstate
market: "Nothing in the purpose animating the Commerce Clause forbids
a state, in the absence of Congressional action, from participating in the
market and exercising its right to favor its citizens over others."'" The
Court reached the same result in Reeves Inc. v. Stake,32 when it refused
to balance South Dakota's in-state preference for cement purchasers against
the dormant Commerce Clause interest in a free market:
28. Id. at 2964.
29. Id.
30. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
31. 426 U.S. at 810.
32. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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The competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary
actions often will be subtle, complex, politically charged and difficult
to assess under traditional commerce clause analysis. Given those
factors Alexandria Scrap wisely recognized that, as a rule, the ad-
justment of interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress
than this court.33
This author suggests that, contrary to the suggestion in Commonwealth
Edison, if some form of taxes on nonrenewable resources is essential to
the survival of some states in the federal system, the task of protecting
those states from exploitation by more populous states may ultimately be
a role that must be filled by the Court and not Congress. If Congress acts
to limit state severance taxes unreasonably, the Court will have to evaluate
that legislation. While the Court is correct in concluding that setting the
appropriate level of a severance tax is a legislative task "in the first
instance," determining whether a federal limit on state taxes is so ex-
cessive as to put too much stress on the constitutional fabric of federalism
is, in the final analysis, a task for the court.
To sustain the argument that the Court has such a function, it must
first be established there is a constitutional limit on congressional activity
in this area. It can be persuasively argued that in some states with non-
renewable resources, excise taxes are essential to state survival in the
federal system. Stated another way, principles of federalism do not tolerate
"ghost states" when a state's non-renewable resources are depleted. Rather
a state has a duty to its citizens to continue to exercise the powers reserved
to it under the tenth amendment-it cannot constitutionally go out of
business. For some states, reinvestment of revenue from a resource excise
tax placed into a trust fund such as Montana's may be the only way a
state can continue to function after its depletable resources are removed.
The court in Commonwealth Edison recognized the state's right to raise
revenue for the loss of tax base:
There can be no doubt that Montana may constitutionally raise
general revenue by imposing a severance tax on coal mined in the
state. The entire value of the coal, before transportation, originating
in the state, and mining of the coal depletes the resource base and
wealth of the state, thereby diminishing a future source of taxes and
economic activity.34
The Court's holding, however, raises a serious question whether the Court
would support that right in the face of an act of Congress destroying it.35
33. 447 U.S. at 439.
34. Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2957.
35. The language of the court in Commonwealth Edison is strong: "The simple fact is that the
appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution."
Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
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The arguments in favor of state severance taxation are supported not
only by basic principles of federalism; they make sense in terms of basic
theories of capital. As each ton of mineral is consumed from resource
exporting states, the state moves inevitably toward a future dramatic
contraction of its tax base. This removal of the resource from the state
is the equivalent of depletion of a capital asset. The financial reserves
necessary to offset this loss can therefore be termed the equivalent of the
"replacement cost" which must be captured by a resource excise tax.
It is possible to make a comparison between a state's economy and its
need to meet its replacement costs and a private business's needs to replace
capital stock. Among other things, the private decisionmaker is concerned
with the amount of his capital stock; it is this capital stock upon which
the private decisionmaker depends to produce his income. That is, the
private decisionmaker is interested in conserving or making plans for
replacing his capital stock. In fact, accounting practices are designed to
force firms to report more accurately their financial condition by esti-
mating the cost of replacing their capital stock, rather than simply charging
off a portion of the original purchase price of this capital stock. Similarly,
it can be argued that the capital stock which produces the income of a
state must either be conserved or plans should be made to replace it with
new kinds of capital in the future. For states or localities whose economies
are based on activities that are indefinitely renewable, this task is not
particularly burdensome, although even in these cases lack of foresight
can allow the development of an outmoded and exhausted industrial base.
For states whose economies are based on the extraction of resources that
are unequivocally nonrenewable and exhaustible, this task is formidable.
Although no certain date may be set for the eventual depletion of its
economic assets, that depletion is inevitable and must be anticipated.
Since, in a federal system a state is not free to keep its nonrenewable
resources from other states, it must look for replacement capital.
Thus, the public interest in asset depletion in the case of nonrenewable
resources can be viewed as a special case of the economic theory of
capital. The key to developing this concept in the context of capital theory
revolves around the cost accounting for the nonrenewable resource. It is
instructive, at this point, to draw the analogy, once again, with the private
decisionmaker's cost-accounting decisions for a nonrenewable resource.
First of all, a nonrenewable natural resource exhibits the characteristic
that current-period uses will affect the availability of the resource in future
periods. The exploitation of this type of resource in the current period
will force the private decisionmaker to replace the unit of resource at
some point during the future if he expects to continue in business, thereby
implying that the cost of this resource is the expenditure that is necessary
to replace the unit of resource. As noted above, in industry this cost is
July 19821
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called replacement cost. In this case, the price the private decisionmaker
should accept for the resource should cover not only the operating cost
of extracting the resource but also the replacement cost.
Now suppose the nonrenewable resource asset is owned by a public
agency. In particular, assume that the public agency is a state government,
and exploitation of the nonrenewable resource within the state's jurisdiction
is subject to the state government's decisionmaking process. In this case we
no longer need to be concerned with the entrepreneurial profit necessary to
make the resource available, as is the case with the private decisionmaker,
but the public decisionmaker must still cover his costs. In particular, the
public decisionmaker requires that payment for the resource cover both the
operating cost and the replacement cost to the public.
For a state government whose tax base is heavily dependent on resource-
related activities, failure to charge this replacement cost will inevitably lead
to a shrinkage in the tax revenues necessary for the conduct of public
business. In the extreme case of a state that is entirely dependent on non-
renewable resources, the contraction would be complete thereby creating a
"ghost state" analogous to the numerous "ghost towns" that dot the western
United States. Yet, as noted above, this result is constitutionally unaccept-
able.
From a national or international perspective this local contraction could
conceivably be economically justified on the grounds that it would be
cheaper to vacate the geographic area that is no longer productive and
pay to remove the indigenous population than to pay the replacement cost
charges. However, it is not at all clear that the cost of such a massive
relocation would be cheaper. Certainly the larger the area, the less likely
that the evacuation alternative would be socially acceptable, even on
narrow grounds of dollar cost. Therefore, a state government must charge
these replacement costs and take these steps to ensure a financial conti-
nuity to its services.36
Constitutional support for a state's right to capture an equity interest
from its non-renewable natural resources may also be found in the state
36. A state government may decide, as did Montana, to establish a permanent fund and to
contribute a portion of resources tax revenues to the fund so that this permanent fund will be available
in the future as a source of income to replace the tax revenue that will be lost once a given resource
is exhausted. To quantify this objective, one would have to determine the amount of income, C,
that on an annual basis must be derived from the permanent fund in order to make up for the loss
of the resource industry. If 3 is the rate of return on financial investments achieved by state gov-
emnment, the fund size, K, must have reached a level by the end of the resource life as determined
by equation: C = 3K. States would argue that before the resource leaves the state they should be
able at a minimum to extract a tax that will ultimately yield a fund equal to K, so that it can generate
revenue equal to C in this equation. In L. BROWN, et al., LEGAL ISSUES IN STATE TAXATION
OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (1978), economics professor Lee Brown makes the above argument
very clearly. He gives specific examples of how such a tax might be calculated to derive a "re-
placement cost" for uranium.
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as "market participant" Commerce Clause cases.37 While the state as
market regulator cannot prefer its business interests over out-of-state
interests, the court has taken a different view when the state participates
in the market place either by selling its products38 or distributing its
wealth.39 When the state assesses a nondiscriminatory severance tax to
cover its replacement costs, it is acting more as a market participant than
a regulator. The tax rate it sets is the price it will accept for allowing the
resource to leave the state. And, as noted above, that price must be, at
a minimum, sufficient to insure the state's viability in the federal system.
Further, if a resource excise tax is essential to a state's survival and that
survival is threatened by majoritarian domination by Congress, then the
court is the only forum to which the state can turn. 40
The words of Justice Brandeis suggest that the court has not taken
lightly its role of protecting the states' opportunity to prosper in the federal
system:
To stay experimentation [by States] in things social and economic
is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
frought with serious consequences to the Nation.4'
Indeed, if the minority of exporting states are as politically powerless
as Justice White indicates, the obligation to protect their interests is
suggested even further by the now famous footnote 4 in United States v.
Caroline Products, where Justice Stone concluded that domination of
"discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching inquiry. "
42
A small state with its future vested in nonrenewable resources may
well be even more subject to the potentiality of exploitation by Congress
than the less loosely politically organized associations that have been
afforded this "searching judicial inquiry. " 43 The fact that the exploitation
may involve domination by majoritarian politics in the Congress rather
37. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980).
38. In Reeves, the court concluded that South Dakota's "protectionist" measure of discriminating
against non-residents in allocation of cement from a state operated plant was constitutional because
it reflected "the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government-to serve the
citizens of the State." 447 U.S. at 442. States would certainly argue that a state severance tax is
precisely the same type of "protectionist" but essential measure.
39. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
40. See text and accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
41. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). See also Reeves Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. at 437.
42. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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than at the state level is not a persuasive argument to insulate it from
review." Further, the argument that the court cannot address economic
theory45 and determine monopolistic advantage is undercut by its decisions
in the antitrust field where the central issue is the potential for market
monopoly.46 Nor, does the fact that evaluating a tax may involve line
drawing serve as a valid distinction in light of the courts extensive in-
volvement in the reapportionment " and school busing cases."
In Commonwealth Edison, the court may have gone far in curtailing
its role in determining the appropriate amount of "equity" a state may
retain when its nonrenewable resources are severed. If in an energy crisis
an act of Congress unreasonably curtails severance taxes and threatens
total exploitation of the resource exporting state's "minority" position,
the court will be called upon to review Congress's action. It is hoped that
the broad non-justiciability language of Commonwealth Edison does not
foreclose that review.
44. Indeed, the fact that it is Congress exercising the domination makes the argument even more
compelling that the court is the appropriate forum. When it is Congress curbing the state's power,
the issue is placed in the court's lap by default. The Federalist no. 78, at 508 (A. Hamilton)
(sesquicentennial ed. 1937) recognized this point in discussing the need for judicial review.
[The] independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing
men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes disseminate among the
people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information
and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the meantime to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppression of the minority party in the
community..
45. The inability to calculate the possible economic impact of a state severance tax is by far the
most persuasive argument against judicial action in this area. These problems are summarized nicely
in the excellent survey article by Professor Walter Hellerstein: Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations
on State Tax Exportation, 1982 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 3, 29-42. In this article,
Professor Hellerstein argues persuasively that the court should not intervene in this controversy
because of the complexity of the factual issues and the political nature of the case. While indeed
this may be the correct choice where Congress has not acted, if the Congress acts to set a ceiling
on state taxes then it will be the court's duty to act to evaluate the ceiling for encroachment on state
sovereignty. In this event, the words of Justice Blackmun in dissent in Commonwealth Edison will
be appropriate: "The complexity of a properly presented federal question is hardly a suitable basis
for denying federal courts the power to adjudicate." Commonwealth Edison, 101 S. Ct. at 2971,
n. 17 quoting dissent in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1809, n. 25 (1981). Indeed, if
whether a tax is, in fact, exported to sister states is so complicated as to deny rational proof, then
there is legitimate question whether Congress should enact a ceiling. If one is nevertheless enacted,
if states are entitled to levy at least enough severance taxes to constitutionally stay in business, the
states tax need would certainly appear to be susceptible of proof. See BROWN, supra note 36 and
text preceding notes 35 and 36 supra. The inability of the Congress to prove the ceiling is correct
should not foreclose the states from proving it is not.
46. See M. DUGGAN, ANTITRUST AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1972).
47. Compare Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) with Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973).
48. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklensonburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The
supposed inability to draw lines in this area is further undercut by cases such as Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard v. Filburn, the court had no trouble sustaining federal legislation
based entirely on the economic theory that to bolster the interstate wheat market it was necessary
to curtail on-farm consumption of home grown wheat.
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A congressional limitation on resource excise taxes raises other policy
questions in addition to those of federalism. If a state has a constitutionally
protected equity interest in its resources, then a state's resource excise
tax reflects part of the true cost of the resource-what the state is de-
manding as compensation for loss of its resources. If this is true, some
economists persuasively argue that external market factors will ultimately
determine the state's ability to levy the tax.49 If a severance tax pushes
the price of coal to a level greater than the market will pay, then in theory
the consumer will shift to alternative markets. If the state is injured by
the market shift, it will eventually lower the tax. In New Mexico, the
dramatic downturn in the market for uranium has caused a reduction in
the severance tax. °
If a state is forced by Congress to allow its resources to go out of state
at an artificially low price (bearing a severance tax that does not meet
the cost of state government), the state will ultimately have to take other
measures to cut production or otherwise attempt to indirectly leverage
higher tax rates. At the same time, consumers will expect the commodity
at an artificially low price (free of tax) and invest heavily in the resources.
When and if the state is politically able to collect its tax, it will be levied
in the face of disproportionate investment by consumers who have com-
mitted capital resources based on an expected low tax rate. Certainly the
current problems with the long history of natural gas price ceilings5'
suggest that Congress may not be the appropriate vehicle for making
long-term decisions regarding prices to be set on natural resources.
Industries need to know with certainty what severance taxes may be
over the life of resource extraction. When substantial investments of
capital are involved, reliance on an unrealistic ceiling can be costly to
industry and consumer alike. 2
49. See R. F. CONRAD and R. B. HOOL, TAXATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES (1980)
and Gillis, Evolution of Natural Resource Taxation in Developing Countries (This Issue), and M.
GILLIS, TAXATION AND MINING (1977). Compare Gulley, Severance Taxes and Market Failure
(This Issue). See also A. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1981).
For a concise summary of these issues a lawyer can understand, see Hellerstein, supra note 6.
50. N.M. STAT ANN. §7-36-25 (1978) as amended June 1982; Senate Bill 75, ch. 29 (1982).
This reduction in severance taxes occurred notwithstanding the substantial externality costs associated
with uranium extraction and processing. Erickson and Gillis, High Level Enterprise and Low Level
Radioactivity: Two Hazards in Developing Country Uranium Concessioons. VI J. OF ENERGY
AND DEV. 39 (1980).
51. For a discussion of some of the practical market impacts associated with rapid price escalation
of natural gas prices see Ellis and DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB L.
REV. 333 (1978).
52. While a federal ceiling may appear to provide certainty, states with a vested interest will
undoubtedly struggle to get their equity elsewhere through income taxes, ad valorem property taxes
and, if the minerals are on state land, through royalties. While it is true an outside industry may
not have a substantial political constituency within a particular state and in that sense be at a
disadvantage, it may gain much better information if it deals directly with the state legislature than
through an end-run through Congress.
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The principle of federal ceilings on state taxes on all goods destined
for interstate commerce also seems frighteningly limitless.53 Would the
auto industry be entitled to a federal ceiling on state production, and ad
valorem property taxes? Finally, would a flat 12.5% tax limit be appro-
priate for a state like Alaska where virtually all of its coal is destined for
international markets in Southeast Asia?54 For those states who presently
have a low severance tax, would the 12.5% become the national standard
to which they should raise their tax with immunity from legal or political
challenge? If Texas raised its 4.6% severance tax on oil and gas to 12.5%,
and there was no significant demand shift, 1979 revenues of slightly more
than a billion dollars would rise to 2.5 billion dollars per year.5 These
questions raise serious concerns about a congressional ceiling. Further,
in light of recent criticism of federal spending and the need to shift fiscal
responsibility back to the states, it seems somewhat inconsistent to suggest
limiting the state's ability to raise revenue.
Ironically, the arguments for federal legislation under the Commerce
Clause have been traditionally aimed not at foreclosing states from being
too protective of their resources but rather at keeping states from engaging
in destructive competition which causes them to sacrifice their most pre-
cious resources. When Congress perceived that destructive market com-
petition between states was causing them to sacrifice the resource of child
labor, Congress acted under the Commerce Clause to limit their com-
petition:
The motive and purpose of the present regulation is plainly to make
effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate
commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the.
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions,
which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states
from and to which the commerce flows. 6
This principle is illustrated in the recent Supreme Court decision of
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association." The
53. This point and others discussed at notes 54-55 infra are thoughtfully and thoroughly discussed
by Kneese, supra note 5.
54. See Brody and Devris, coal policy paper: Leasing and Taxation, House Research Agency
Report 80-4 (1981). Surely the same considerations militating against the so-called capture of
"economic rents" do not apply when the coal is sold on the competitive international market rather
than for consumption in sister states.
55. See Kneese supra note 53 at 25.
56. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Hodel raises other fascinating questions regarding the tenth amendment
far beyond the scope of this article. Chief among these is whether National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is a resurrection of the tenth amendment or a one-time lapse into
history. In Hodel, the court stated that the tenth amendment was a bar to congressional action that
"regulates states as states," that addresses matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sover-
eignty" and if applied would directly impair the states' ability "to structure integral operations in
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Court expressly recognized that interstate competition for coal would
have the direct effect of preventing states from engaging in state programs
for environmental protection. Unregulated interstate competition would
mean that to "compete" with sister states, the states with good environ-
mental protection laws would have to abandon them. Congress was held
to have power to prevent this destructive competition under the Commerce
Clause. Specifically, it held that the Surface Coal Mining Reclamation
Act was enacted to ensure that "[c]ompetition in interstate commerce
among sellers of coal produced in different states will not undermine the
ability of the several states to improve and maintain adequate standards
on coal mining operations within their borders." 58 The prevention of this
sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congres-
sional action under the Commerce Clause. 9
If states are reluctant to levy severance taxes to insure the prosperity
of future generations, the result may someday be more extensive federal
spending than is now occurring in Appalachia.
Eastern seaboard cities with presently large populations and declining
tax bases could have benefited by planning earlier for alternative funding
from sources other than the federal government or attempting to curtail
their growth over time. The argument could thus be made that if federal
legislation is to be drafted at all, there is constitutional and historical
support for legislation requiring severance taxes rather than curtailing
them. Whether future legislation curtails severance taxes or supports
them, when Congress acts in this area it will be the court's duty to measure
these provisions against the principles of federalism reflected in the Com-
merce Clause and the constitutional history that has given it life.
areas of traditional functions." A prohibition against severance taxes would seem to fit squarely
under this criteria. How the court would balance the federal and state interests; the relationship
between the tenth amendment and the property clause article IV §3 (see Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976)) if severance taxes were prohibited only on federal property; and the extent
of Congress's power to prohibit taxes on state owned coal (see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980)) are beyond the scope of this article.
58. 30 U.S.C. §1201(a).
59. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282-282.
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